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ABSTRACT
We analyze if a rise in private consumption following an exogenous
rise in government spending is a feature of the economy under optimal
stabilization in a standard New Keynesian setting augmented for the
presence of liquidity-constrained agents and non-separable preferences.
Our results provide little evidence in support of a crowd-in effect under
‘timelessly optimal’ policy.
JEL Classification: E21, E52, E61, E63.
Keywords: Consumption, Government Spending, Optimal Monetary and
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We model an economy in which both liquidity constraints and non-separable
preferences can be introduced as a straightforward generalization of a standard
baseline model, and seek an answer to the question: Does a rise in private
consumption follow a rise in government spending under optimal stabilization?
The question of the e⁄ects of government spending on private consumption
has been a matter of intense debate in macroeconomics stretching over many
years. Recently, it has been proposed in important contributions to the literature
that departures from standard assumptions about consumer behaviour might play
a role in providing a theoretical justi￿cation for a rise in private consumption
following an increase in government spending.1 Gal￿ et al. (2007), Erceg et
al. (2006) and Coenen et al. (2007) have been the most notable theoretical
contributions. The empirical literature is more split on the idea but still generally
supportive of the basic proposition.2 The papers we refer to have analyzed the
e⁄ects of a government spending shock in the context of models that do not assume
optimal conduct of policy.
We look at the e⁄ects of government spending on private consumption from a
normative perspective. We ￿nd that a rise in private consumption following a rise
in government spending is generally not a feature of the economy under optimal
stabilization even if the description of consumer behaviour departs from the
conventions of macroeconomics. A crowd-in e⁄ect only emerges in circumstances
that might be di¢ cult to reconcile with reality in advanced economies. For
instance, this is the case in an economy without liquidity constraints in which
agents are signi￿cantly risk-averse or in an economy with a very large share of
1Such a response in consumption has been identi￿ed in a substantial part of empirical
literature. See Gal￿ et al. (2007) for a thorough review and some new results.
2See Coenen and Straub (2005), L￿pez-Salido and Rabanal (2006) and Forni et al. (2007).
2liquidity-constrained agents, high labour supply elasticity and low risk aversion.
Our framework is a standard New Keynesian economy in which prices are
sticky and preferences can be made non-separable. We augment this framework
for the presence of liquidity-constrained agents whom we shall henceforth refer to
as non-Ricardian. We study dynamics under ￿ timelessly-optimal￿monetary and
￿scal policy in this economy using a linear-quadratic setup.3 In a conceptually
related analysis, Bilbiie (2008) characterizes optimal discretionary and timelessly
optimal monetary policy. Important simplifying assumptions that underlie his
setup are that neither the ￿scal consequences of monetary policy nor the ￿rst-
order e⁄ects of stabilization policy are considered.4 In our framework, where
monetary and ￿scal policy have to be coordinated to attain the optimal outcome
and in which stabilization policy has level e⁄ects, these ￿rst-order e⁄ects turn out
to play a key role in explaining optimal dynamics in the model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the
microeconomic foundations of the model. Section 3 presents the model of the
linear economy and the quadratic objective function of the policy maker that
follow from the micro-foundations. In Section 3 we also characterize the optimal
dynamics of the economy using ￿ speci￿c targeting rules￿of Svensson (2002, 2003).
It is a feature of our analysis worth emphasizing that the policy problem of the
non-Ricardian economy as well as the optimal policy rules can be presented as a
generalization of the baseline setup with Ricardian agents only, with the functional
forms una⁄ected by the presence of non-Ricardian behaviour. The e⁄ects of the
rise in government spending on private consumption and the determinants of the
consumption response are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
3See Woodford (2003), for instance, for a thorough explanation of the concept of policies
optimal from a ￿ timeless perspective￿ .
4Bilbiie (2008) also ￿nds that the presence of liquidity-constrained agents beyond a threshold
share may induce a change in the sign of the slope coe¢ cient in the ￿ IS￿relationship, introducing
￿ inverted aggregate demand logic￿into the analysis. We shall return to this point in Section 4.2.
32. The economy
In this section, we present a general equilibrium framework in which liquidity-
constrained agents make up a stable proportion of all agents in the economy. We
allow for heterogeneity among agents in terms of access to the asset market but
our setup enables us to maintain much of the tractability of the representative
agent framework.5 This feature of the analysis then facilitates the use of modern
methods of optimal policy determination.
2.1. Comsumers
Consider an economy inhabited by a continuum of agents indexed by k 2 [0;1].
The agents￿utility is increasing in consumption C and leisure (1 ￿ H). As in Gal￿
et al. (2004), we assume the following functional form for the utility of agents
u =
[C (1 ￿ H)
!]
1￿e ￿￿1
1 ￿ e ￿
￿1 (2.1)
with ! > 0 and e ￿
￿1 > 0. Let us assume that the agents are identical in all
aspects except for their access to the asset market. Agents indexed k 2 [0;￿] have
no access to the asset market, whilst agents k 2 (￿;1] can smooth consumption
over time by varying their holdings of one-period nominal government debt￿ the
only type of asset available in the economy.
2.1.1. Non-Ricardian agents
Agents who have no access to the asset market have to rely on current after-tax
wage income to ￿nance consumption. It can be shown that given a simple budget
constraint that makes consumption equal to the after-tax wage, the period utility
5This is partly due to the way preferences of individuals are described and partly due to the
formulation of the government￿ s objective. More discussion will follow.
















for all t. The variable ￿ denotes tax on wage income, W is the economy-wide
nominal wage rate and P is the price index. Constant labour supply by non-
Ricardian agents over time and across states of nature facilitates aggregation in
the model.
2.1.2. Ricardian agents
The problem to be solved by the Ricardian agents￿ as we shall refer to the
agents who smooth consumption over time￿ can be written as a problem of a









































for all T > t. The variable bR stands for (1 + i)BR=P in which BR is the
stock of nominal, one-period government debt held by the Ricardian agents. The
nominal interest rate is denoted i: While the non-Ricardian agents are workers
only, Ricardian agents hold stakes in ￿rms. The variable D denotes dividends
received on the basis of ownership of ￿rms.
5Combining the ￿rst-order conditions with respect to CR and HR from the

































in which Et￿t+1 is expected in￿ ation with ￿t = Pt=Pt￿1. The relationship (2.7)
solved in a multi-period form also de￿nes the asset pricing kernel Qt;T:
2.1.3. Aggregation














t + (1 ￿ ￿)C
R
t : (2.8)
A similar relationship holds for labour supply
Ht = ￿H
NR + (1 ￿ ￿)H
R
t : (2.9)
Since our asset holders are identical in all aspects, the holdings of assets will be
distributed among them uniformly across time and state of nature. If aggregate



















(1 ￿ Ht): (2.11)

















(1 ￿ Ht)(1 + !)
￿
: (2.13)
We can thus express all variables in terms of aggregate variables and carry on
solving the model using standard methods developed to identify optimal policy in
representative agent frameworks.
2.2. Firms
Let us assume a continuum of monopolistically competitive producers of
di⁄erentiated intermediate goods (indexed j). These goods then serve as an input
in the production of a single ￿nal good. The production technology of the ￿nal
good￿ produced by a representative ￿rm operating in a perfectly competitive










where y (j) is the quantity of an intermediate good used in the production of Y .
The coe¢ cient " denotes the costant elasticity of substitution between individual
goods. A simple cost minimization exercise by ￿nal goods producers yields the
expression for the demand for intermediate good j















7Let us also assume that the production of the intermediate goods is described by
the production function
yt (j) = Ht (j)
1=￿ (2.17)


















The producers of intermediate goods maximize pro￿ts given by
￿(j) = p(j)y (j) ￿ WH (j): (2.20)
They do so in a forward-looking way, evaluating an expected stream of pro￿ts.
We assume a price setting mechanism of the type put forward by Calvo (1983)
with ￿ 2 (0;1) denoting the probability for a ￿rm of charging unchanged prices
in any period. With p￿
t being the price chosen for period t by all ￿rms who can


































The government raises revenues T via distortionary taxes on wage income to
￿nance exogenous government spending G. It issues one-period nominal bonds to
8bridge the gap between taxation and spending. The government, therefore, faces
the ￿ ow budget constraint
Bt = (1 + it￿1)Bt￿1 ￿ Ptst (2.23)
where B denotes the volume of one-period nominal bonds issued by the ￿scal








Monetary and ￿scal authorities, the two branches of the central government,
coordinate their actions to ensure that social welfare given by the discounted sum













is maximized. Arguably, maximizing the discounted value of weighted period
utilities is a valid representation of social welfare if lack of access to the asset
market comes from constraints rather than individual preferences.6
There are several ways to proceed from here. In this paper, we solve for the
approximate optimal plan by formulating a linear-quadratic approximate policy
problem. For models where stabilization policy has signi￿cant ￿rst-order welfare
e⁄ects, which happens when there are non-zero linear terms in the approximation
to social welfare, the construction of a second-order-accurate welfare ranking
6See Bilbiie (2008). Such a speci￿cation of the policy objective is also helpful, as it facilitates
the derivation of the approximate Ramsey problem. An alternative way of setting up the same
policy problem would be to assume that agents receive a signal whether they have or have no
access to the asset market in the beginning of each period. Amato and Laubach (2003) have
used this approach to introduce inertial rule-of-thumb behaviour into a framework similar to
ours. Such a setup￿ arguably a less intuitive one in present circumstances￿ would, however,
necessitate some further assumptions to make sure the transversality condition is satis￿ed and
that there is no need to track the distribution of assets as a separate state variable.
9criterion requires a second-order approximation to the structural equations. These
are then used to substitute out the linear term from the approximation to social
welfare. One thus obtains a welfare objective expressed purely in second-order
terms with the ￿rst-order e⁄ects preserved in an implicit form.7 In the next
section, we present the structural elements of the approximate problem. The
derivation follows the steps in Benigno and Woodford (2003) and is not presented
in this paper.
3. The macroeconomic model and the policy problem
The micro-foundations discussed in the previous section imply a simple New
Keynesian model of the macroeconomy. The model we present here appears to
be very similar to Benigno and Woodford (2003). We left the notation largely
unchanged to indicate that we can present the economy with non-Ricardian agents
as a generalization of the framework in which consumption-smoothing applies
to all consumers. The main di⁄erence here is that some key parameters of the
model, such as the costliness of volatility in the target variables or the target level
of output, will be a function of the share of liquidity-constrained agents in the
economy. Whilst we do not provide detailed derivations of the following equations,
the Appendix contains de￿nitions of coe¢ cients and variables resulting from the
derivations. In the Appendix, we also plot calibrated values of some of the key
parameters of the linearized model as a function of the share of non-Ricardian
agents.
The supply side of the economy is characterized by the following forward-
looking New Keynesian Phillips curve
￿t = ￿yt + ￿￿ (b ￿t ￿ b ￿
￿
t) + ￿Et￿t+1: (3.1)
7See Benigno and Woodford (2003, 2006) for an extensive treatment.
10The supply equation links current in￿ ation ￿ to the welfare-relevant output gap y,
deviation in taxes and expected future in￿ ation. The output gap here is de￿ned
as the di⁄erence between the actual deviation in output from its steady state
and its ￿ target deviation￿b Y ￿, where the latter follows from the approximation to
welfare. The target deviation b Y ￿ is a function of the exogenous shock(s) only
and hence is independent of policy. In general, it is di⁄erent from the ￿ natural
rate of output￿commonly referred to in the literature on monetary policy. The
￿ target deviation￿in the tax rate b ￿
￿ is the deviation that would o⁄set the cost-
push pressure resulting from the increase in government spending.8 Interestingly,
the coe¢ cients in (3.1) turn out to be independent of lambda. This follows from
the fact that the equilibrium real wage rate and hence also marginal cost in our
economy only depends on aggregate variables, as implicitly de￿ned in (2.11).
The government￿ s ￿ ow budget constraint can be shown to yield the following
￿scal sustainability condition expressed in terms of the ￿ gap-variables￿in (3.1)
b bt￿1 ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿









’ is the ￿ ￿scal stress￿term introduced in Benigno and Woodford (2003) as a
composite measure of the consequences for ￿scal solvency of the spending shock.
Finally, it follows from (2.25) that the central government conducts monetary



















Benigno and Woodford (2003, 2006) explain the methodological background of
deriving a quadratic function such as (3.3) that is able provide a second-order
8See Benigno and Woodford (2003) for an in-depth treatment of these concepts.
11accurate welfare ranking of alternate policies in the presence of non-negligible level
e⁄ects, whilst the structural equations, (3.1) and (3.2), together with appropriate
initial commitments (to be discussed below), are accurate only up to the ￿rst
order.
We now follow Woodford (2003) and derive the policy optimal from a ￿ timeless
perspective￿ . We need to restrict the policy choices for period t so that the policy
maker uses the same procedure to formulate policy as in later periods. The























b bT￿1 ￿ ￿T ￿ ￿
￿1yT + ’T ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)fyyT ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)f￿ (b ￿T ￿ b ￿
￿
T)














These are commitments regarding values of endogenous variables the expectations
of which are relevant for the determination of equilibrium in period t ￿ 1. The
speci￿cation of these commitments follows from the long-run solution to the
model. Policies that satisfy these commitments are necessarily time-consistent.
The ￿rst-order conditions from this policy problem can be combined to obtain
the ￿ speci￿c targeting rules￿in the sense of Svensson (2002, 2003)
Et￿T = 0 (3.5)







(yt ￿ yt￿1) = 0: (3.6)
These rules de￿ne the relationships between aggregate variables that the monetary
and ￿scal branches of the central government authority should aim to bring about
in a coordinated fashion. Again, we preserved the notation from Benigno and
Woodford (2003). However, the coe¢ cients in (3.6) will be a function of ￿. The
system comprising these targeting rules and the constraints in (3.4) de￿nes the
optimal dynamics of the economy.
To make our structural framework complete, we derive the log-linearized
version of (2.7) using the approximation to consumption and welfare-relevant
output gaps to obtain the intertemporal ￿ IS￿relationship, which describes the
demand side of the economy
yt = Etyt+1 ￿ ￿
￿





The variable b r￿ here represents the deviation in the interest rate that is consistent
with the preference-driven target deviation in output b Y ￿ under stable prices.
b r￿ depends on exogenous real variables only and hence, cannot be a⁄ected by
government policy. b it = log 1+it
1+i ; where i is the steady state interest rate
determined by the rate of time preference. Combining this equation with (3.6) in
an appropriate manner gives us the ￿ expectations-based￿reaction function for the
interest rate9
it = b r
￿














(m￿ + n￿): (3.9)
9See Evans and Honkapohja (2006).
13In the next section, we shall concentrate on one particular aspect of the optimal
dynamics. We shall examine the e⁄ects of an exogenous increase in government
spending on private consumption under optimal stabilization.
4. E⁄ects of government spending on private consumption
We study numerical calibrations of the optimal dynamics derived in the previous
section and examine if departures from conventional modelling of consumer
behaviour￿ as suggessted by Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Mankiw (2000) and
Basu and Kimball (2000)￿ could signi￿cantly alter the conclusions regarding the
e⁄ect of government spending on consumption under optimal policy. A link
between the way consumer behaviour is modelled and the nature of the response
in consumption to a spending shock has been suggested in the context of models
assuming a simple rule-based conduct of policy, as explained in the introduction.10
4.1. Calibration
We calibrate the model of the optimal economy using the following structural
parameter values. The quarterly discount rate, ￿, is calibrated to a commonly
used value of 0:99, implying an annualized steady-state rate of interest just over 4
percent. The consumption share of national income, c, is 0:8. The value of e ￿
￿1 is
set to 1 in the baseline calibration, which implies a log-linear (separable) functional
form and is varied from low values of around 0:13 estimated in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997) to high values exceeding 1 commonly used in the literature which
estimates the elasticity of consumption to the real interest rate to be very low.
The value of ! in the utility function is calibrated so that the Frisch elasticity




=H from (2.11)) takes on a value of 1, as in
10In section A.3 of the Appendix, we present a simple algebraic analysis that helps linking
our model to earlier literature on consumer behaviour.
14Gal￿ et. al (2004). Apart from this baseline case, we consider a signi￿cantly less
elastic labour supply function and a signi￿cantly more elastic one. We assume
an approximate 11 percent price markup in the product market, arising due to
imperfect competition among intermediate goods producers. We set ￿ = 1:25 so
that the production function governing the production of intermediate goods is
of decreasing-returns-to-scale type. The price stickiness parameter in the Calvo-
pricing model ￿ has been set to 0:65. The steady state labour income tax rate is
30 percent. These parameter values imply a steady-state surplus-to-GDP ratio of
0:016 and hence b=Y = 1:6 or a debt level of 40 percent of steady-state output on
an annual basis.
Solving the ￿rms￿￿rst-order condition under no price dispersion yields two
solutions for the steady-state output, one of which represents a special case with
the Ricardian agents consuming no leisure (H
R
= 1) so that H = 1+!￿!￿
1+! . By
(2.6), this implies a corner solution case, a case of zero consumption for Ricardians
in the steady state. A positive deviation from this steady state then implies an
in￿nite increase in utility for Ricardian agents and for the whole economy too.
We therefore concentrate on the interior solution. The corresponding steady-
state level of output is independent of ￿: This follows from the fact that the
economy-wide real wage rate, and hence also marginal cost, depend only on
aggregate variables, as de￿ned in (2.11). The share of non-Ricardian agents in
the economy ￿ is varied from 0 to an upper bound of lambda ￿. This upper
bound represents the share of non-Ricardian agents at which Ricardian agents
stop supplying labour to the economy. This result arises, as it holds in the steady
state that H
R
6 H < H
NR
for all ￿:
In the analysis presented here, including all calibrations in the sensitivity
analysis, the parameter values yield positive coe¢ cients qy and q￿ in the loss
function (3.3). The objective function is then convex and the optimal solutions
15presented in the next section are consistent with minimum losses in terms of the
loss function (3.3).
4.2. Determinacy issues
For most parameter values used in the calibration exercise, the dynamic system
comprising the ￿rst-order conditions from the policy problem and the structural
equations yields an optimal solution which can be implemented as a unique and
stable solution to the dynamic system of structural equations if policy is set
according to optimal expectations-based reaction functions for policy instruments.
There are a few special cases when such a solution cannot be obtained. This
happens when the aggregate demand relationship changes its slope and at some
point becomes perfectly inelastic.11
The fact that the IS relationship can swivel is an issue identi￿ed in Bilbiie
(2008). He referred to the phenomenon of having an upward-sloping aggregate
demand relationship as ￿ inverted aggregate demand logic￿ . We ￿nd evidence of
this phenomenon in our model too. For large values of e ￿
￿1, the change of slope
occurs at relatively low levels of ￿. We can con￿rm that this also implies a change
in the optimal long-run response to in￿ ation in the ￿ expectations-based￿interest
rate reaction function, which is greater than one for standard downward-sloping
aggregate demand relationships and becomes less than one when consumption
rises in response to a rise in the real interest rate. Figure 4.1 shows how the
(inverse) slope of the aggregate demand relationship varies with ￿ for e ￿
￿1 = 8
as well as the corresponding optimal long-run response of the interest rate to
in￿ ation.
11Mathematically, these determinacy problems do not arise if the optimal policy is
implemented through the speci￿c targeting rules speci￿ed above. In practice, the problem
might prevail, as even though policy is formulated and communicated via targeting rules, it may
be unavoidable to specify an interest-rate path to implement the optimal policy at operational
level using reaction functions.
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Figure 4.1: The (inverse) slope of the IS relationship and the long-run response
to in￿ ation in the interest rate reaction function
4.3. Optimal consumption dynamics
We now turn to examining optimal consumption dynamics following an exogenous,
serially-uncorrelated rise in government spending of 1 percent of steady-state
output. Figure 4.2 plots the impulse response functions for private consumption
under di⁄erent calibrations of agents￿ preferences and price stickiness in an
economy without liquidity constraints.12 Two properties need to be highlighted
here. First, the optimal behaviour of private consumption is non-stationary in
an environment with nominal rigidity. This is in line with the observations
made in Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004).
Under ￿ exible prices though, in￿ ation can be freely used to deal with the ￿scal
consequences of the government spending shock and taxes vary only to ensure the
121 on the vertical axis denotes a one-percent deviation from the pre-shock steady-state value.

















Figure 4.2: Private consumption dynamics in response to the rise in government
spending in an economy with Ricardian agents only
output gap is zero throughout. Hence, once the shock dies out and the steady-
state level of output becomes the target level, all variables return to their pre-
shock steady state levels. Second, we see that the optimal intial response in
private consumption is consistently negative for most calibrations. However, it is
also clear that higher degrees of risk aversion and higher values of labour supply
elasticity tend to make the response less negative. In fact, when risk aversion is
very high, the optimal response ultimately becomes positive.
Next, we examine how the optimal initial response in private consumption
changes as we introduce and gradually raise the share of non-Ricardian agents
in the economy. Figure 4.3 summarizes our ￿ndings. We ￿nd that the above
mentioned positive optimal response in consumption at high levels of risk aversion
is generally not a feature of economies with non-Ricardian agents. However, a
positive response in consumption can be shown to be consistent with optimal















Figure 4.3: Optimal response in private consumption to a rise in government
spending
policy when the share of non-Ricardian agents is high, labour supply elasticity is
high and the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is low.
Neither of the situations when a positive private consumption response occurs
is, however, likely to be easily reconcilable with reality in advanced economies.
Hence, in our setup, crowding out of private consumption by government spending
is generally consistent with timelessly optimal policy.
4.4. The role of the ￿rst-order e⁄ects of stabilization policy
Whilst there are several factors playing a role in explaining optimal aggregate
dynamics in the economy, it turns out that the ￿rst-order e⁄ects (or level e⁄ects)
of stabilization policy play a dominant role among these.
It follows from the approximation to the ￿rms￿ ￿rst-order condition that
there is a trade-o⁄ between volatility and average outcomes. Forward-looking
19optimizing ￿rms, when faced with a more stable environment, would either change
prices less in response to a shock (ceteris paribus), leading to less price dispersion
and higher e¢ ciency, or, in other words, could allow for somewhat higher average
levels (in fact, a smaller fall) of production and hence average marginal cost over
time for a given chosen price.13 Of course, the public ￿nance implications of such
a trade-o⁄have to be taken into account too when assessing the ￿rst-order e⁄ects
of a reduction in volatility. Having lower volatility necessitates higher average tax
levels (and hence lower output levels) over time to compensate for the positive
e⁄ect of volatility on tax receipts due to the convexity of the tax schedule.
The costliness of a given degree of output volatility, qy, then to a decisive extent
depends (positively) on the welfare e⁄ects of the potential ￿rst-order output gains
arising from lower volatility. An increased average level of output could bring more
utility through a rise in consumption but one also needs to account for the loss
of utility due to the extra labour supply that goes with increased output levels.
The measure of the costliness of volatility in turn determines the target level of
output￿ that is the level around which we aim to stabilize the economy￿ as well
as the optimal size of the output gap. The coe¢ cient qy is inversely related to
both of them. For a su¢ ciently low qy, the optimal response in output becomes
large enough to be consistent with a rise in consumption. On the supply side,
such a large response in output is implemented through tax policy, which takes
the form of a short-term tax cut. The contemporaneous response in net real wages
is then large enough to o⁄set the negative wealth e⁄ect on private consumption
caused by the need to keep taxes permanently higher in the long-run to meet the
13See Benigno and Woodford (2003) for details on the approximation. The story put forward
here is related to Siu (2004) who explains that in a highly volatile environment, risk-averse
producers would always set prices as if they expected a large, positive (in￿ ationary) spending
shock. This happens because they try to avoid a situation in which they would set prices too
low and facing high demand, they would run losses. By contrast, if they set prices too high, the
worst outcome is that the face zero demand and make zero pro￿t.
20￿scal solvency requirement.
Given the preferences of agents, when risk aversion rises beyond the degree
corresponding to logarithmic preferences, the net utility gain from a percentage
increase in the average level of output shrinks and eventually even becomes
negative. Hence, qy falls, and volatility becomes less costly in welfare terms. Thus,
with rising e ￿
￿1, we observe higher volatility, larger initial responses in output and
hence also consumption. Ultimately, the implied consumption response becomes
positive.14
It is, however, enough to have a very small degree of non-Ricardian behaviour
present in the model for the crowd-in e⁄ect to disappear. It happens because the
welfare gains from higher levels of output rise signi￿cantly, as we include non-
Ricardian consumers enjoying extra consumption, whilst the marginal welfare
costs of increased output actually fall due to the convexity of the agents￿utility
function in labour.15 Hence, more stability becomes desirable.
On the other hand, when labour supply elasticity is high and the degree of risk
aversion is small, the welfare gains from extra consumption are relatively small,
and also only small wage hikes are su¢ cient to induce the needed supply of extra
labour by the Ricardians. There is thus little potential welfare gain to be reaped
by the non-Ricardian agents from higher output levels. Moreover, the Ricardians￿
welfare function is then concave in labour causing that supplying extra units of
labour becomes more costly in welfare terms as their share in the population falls.
Then, as we increase the share of non-Ricardian agents, the welfare gains from
more stability are decreasing. More volatility will become desirable and the initial
response in consumption can again become positive.
14Note that given the non-separability in preferences, there is complementarity between
consumption and leisure (labour) and e ￿
￿1 also a⁄ects the disutility of labour. See L￿pez-Salido
and Rabanal (2006) for further discussion.
15Recall that the steady-state labour supply of Ricardian consumers falls as we include hand-
to-mouth consumers.
21In all other circumstances, the desirable degree of volatility is not large enough
to be consistent with a rise in private consumption in the period when the spending
shock hits the economy. In other words, optimal stabilization policy does not
induce a su¢ ciently large short-term response in net real wages in order for
aggregate consumption to rise in response to the rise in government spending.
5. Concluding remarks
We have presented a normative analysis of the question of the crowding out
e⁄ect of government spending. We have done this in a framework which included
the possibility of limited asset market participation by agents and non-separable
individual preferences￿ two features that were suggested in positive work as an
explanation for the empirically detected traces of a crowd-in e⁄ect. Our results
overwhelmingly do not support a positive answer to the question asked in the title
of this paper.
Whilst our analysis sends out a fairly unambiguous message, let us point to
a few issues that have not been dealt with in this paper and could a⁄ect its
conclusions in either direction. We have used a framework and a solution method
that represent the current state-of-the-art in macroeconomics, nevertheless, we
have made some sacri￿ces in the name of tractability and policy-relevance. First,
the absence of capital in the model seems to be the most obvious simplifying
assumption. Relaxing the assumption of capital being constant and normalized
to one would lead to a better understanding of the wealth e⁄ects of increased
government spending. Second, in our model, wages adjust instantaneously to
make sure the labour market clears. As argued in Christiano et al. (1997),
this normally implies a sharp response in real wages which is not supported by
empirical evidence. A di⁄erent approach to modelling individual preferences and
the labour market, as in Gal￿ et al. (2007) for instance, could allow for nominal
22wage rigidities to be modelled alongside imperfectly ￿ exible price adjustment in
an economy where some agents are liquidity constrained. Third, serial correlation
in the spending shock could widen the range of cases when a crowd in e⁄ect is
consistent with optimal policy. It is, however, not straightforward to incorporate
serially-correlated spending shocks into the numerical analysis presented in the
paper, as the ￿scal stress term￿ through which the shock enters the system￿
does not simply inherit the time-series properties of the spending shock.
This discussion suggests that analyzing optimal consumption dynamics in
the context of a medium-scale macroeconomic framework such as Christiano et
al. (2005) extended for the features of consumer behaviour used in this paper
represents a fruitful research agenda. Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2005) o⁄er a
method for solving such optimal policy problems numerically. However, signi￿cant
sacri￿ces in terms of the tractability of the solution would seem inevitable in such
a framework.
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27A. Appendix
A.1. De￿nition of key coe¢ cients
In the ￿rst section of the Appendix, we de￿ne some key coe¢ cients used in the
model in terms of the structural parameters of Section 2.
!p = ￿ ￿ 1
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A.2. Calibrated values of coe¢ cients
In the second section of the Appendix, we plot some of the coe¢ cients de￿ned in
the previous section as a function of the population share of non-Ricardian agents
under baseline calibration described in Section 4.1 of the paper. We also provide
a brief comment on the relative weight of output gap stabilization in the policy
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Figure A.2: Relative weight of output gap stabilization as a function of ￿
As regards the relative weight of output gap stabilization in the policy
objective, Figure A.2 shows that it is generally very low for low levels of lambda.
It falls even further with ￿, if risk aversion is low. However, it rises with ￿ in
all other considered cases. For large degrees of risk aversion or inelastic labour
supply, coupled with a large share of ￿, the importance of output gap stabilization
is comparable with that of stabilizing in￿ ation volatility.
A.3. Links with the literature on consumer behaviour
One way to write the log-linearized version of (2.7) is as follows
Et￿b Ct+1 = e ￿
￿
b it ￿ Et￿t+1
￿
+ ￿YEt￿b Yt+1: (A.1)
Here ￿ denotes change from previous period. The coe¢ cient ￿Y is of particular
importance here. It is de￿ned































H denotes steady-state aggregate labour supply.
Notice that with e ￿
￿1 = 1 and ￿ = 0, which corresponds to the case of a log-
linear speci￿cation of individual utility and no liquidity constraints, ￿Y = 0 and
(A.1) breaks down to a standard intertemporal IS relationship. With e ￿
￿1 = 1 and
￿ > 0; we have ￿Y = ￿￿H, which will be positive as long as H < 1￿!￿=(1 + !):
This case corresponds to Campbell and Mankiw￿ s (1989) explanation of why
researchers estimated a positive coe¢ cient at expected change in aggregate income
in (A.1).16 According to this theory, expected changes in aggregate income are
associated with contemporaneous changes in consumption due to the presence of
liquidity-constrained agents. By contrast, consider the case when e ￿
￿1 6= 1 and
￿ = 0. In such a case, ￿Y = ￿!￿
￿
1 ￿ e ￿
￿1￿
e ￿￿H, which can clearly be positive if
￿H > 0 (which is in turn positive under the same condition as ￿H) and e ￿
￿1 > 1.
This would correspond to the ￿ non-separability in preferences￿story put forward
by Basu and Kimball (2000) as an alternative to Campbell and Mankiw (1989).
Interestingly, Basu and Kimball (2000) estimated e ￿ to be low, perhaps around
one third, enhancing the consistency with the algebraic analysis presented here.
Obviously, a positive coe¢ cient ￿Y might result as a combination of the two
e⁄ects too.
16See Hall (1978), Flavin (1981) and Zeldes (1989) for earlier empirical evidence questioning
the permanent income hypothesis under which no contemporaneous e⁄ects of expected changes
in income on consumption should be observed.
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